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RESCUING BABY DOE
Mary Crossley*
INTRODUCTION

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the Baby Doe Rules offers a
valuable opportunity to reflect on how much has changed during the
past two-and-one-half decades and how much has stayed the same, at
least in situations when parents and physicians face the birth of an
infant who comes into the world with its life in peril.
The most salient changes are the medical advances in the treatment
of premature infants and the changes in social attitudes towards and
legal protections for people with disabilities. The threshold at which a
prematurely delivered infant is considered viable has advanced
steadily earlier into pregnancy, and the interventions developed to
ameliorate the effects of premature delivery have become more-but
not fully-effective, as discussed by other symposium participants.
During the same period, Congress passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)', providing individuals with disabilities with
broad protection against discrimination, and it recently reaffirmed its
intent that the ADA be broadly construed in the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008.2 Despite the advances in medical treatment and in legal
protections for and societal attitudes regarding people with
disabilities, however, the law regarding treatment decisions for
newborns with disabilities has remained remarkably static.
Changes in the past twenty-five years in neonatal medicine and in
the legal and social discourse regarding disability have led to
increased complexity in teasing out how medical treatment choices at
the beginning of life implicate disability concerns. This Essay
describes that increased complexity and how it relates to the
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I owe thanks to Nick
Cassell for his valuable research assistance.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006), amended by ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553-3559 (2008).
2. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553-3354 (2008).
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disability concerns that originally prompted the enactment of the
Baby Doe Rules. It will then proceed to suggest how analogizing
these decisions to rescue situations might inform our thinking about
how to give disability concerns their due. The Essay will close by
suggesting that a richer conception of the Baby Doe Rules as part of
child welfare law may help us situate a role that disability advocacy
might play in influencing-if not controlling-how these complex
situations unfold. The Essay's purpose is not to provide answers to
the questions that vex medical providers about the legal limits on
parental and provider decision-making, but simply to offer a
perspective on the nature of the questions we should ask.
I. INCREASED MEDICAL COMPLEXITY AND THE BABY DOE RULES

Beginning with a brief recap of how disability concerns played a
central role in the passage of the Baby Doe Rules is in order. In 1982
the national news media picked up the story of an infant in Indiana,
referred to simply as Baby Doe. 3 The newborn had been diagnosed as
having Down syndrome and as suffering from a life-threatening
blockage of its digestive tract. Although the latter condition could be
easily corrected by surgery, the parents chose not to have the surgery
performed, and as a result the infant died in less than a week.
The portrayal of an infant being permitted to starve to death,
apparently because it had Down syndrome, prompted a public outcry.
The Reagan Administration responded initially by promulgating
regulations that treated hospitals' failure to provide life-saving
treatment to infants with handicaps as a violation of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 4 which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of handicap by recipients of federal funding. To make a long
story short, this initial approach of deeming selective non-treatment
to be a form of disability discrimination was struck down because,
although the hospitals where disabled infants were born were subject
3. See John A. Robertson, Extreme Prematurity and Parental Rights after Baby Doe, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., July-Aug. 2004, at 33.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
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to section 504's anti-discrimination mandate, it was the parents-not
the hospitals-who made the decision whether to authorize the
surgery or other treatment. 5 The federal anti-discrimination law did
not apply to parents' decisions.
In a second and more enduring effort to craft a legal response to
Baby Doe's case, Congress set limits on parents' treatment decisions
by amending federal child welfare laws that conditioned federal
funding on state child welfare agencies' carrying out certain federally
mandated responsibilities. The Child Abuse Amendments of 19846
are the Baby Doe Rules still in force today.
The essence of the disability rights case against permitting
selective non-treatment in a case like Baby Doe's is straightforward.
The choice not to treat that infant was based on the fact that the life
saved would certainly be a life with a disability. The medical
literature contained clear evidence that many doctors thought such
choices appropriate because of the perceived low quality of life with
a disability, 7 and presumably the medical treatment choices of parents
were influenced by this professional devaluing of life with physical
and cognitive impairments.
Today, the area of greater challenge involves medical decisions for
infants born very prematurely, at the margins of viability. 8 Part of the
challenge is to determine how the Baby Doe Rules should be
interpreted to apply to these situations as a legal matter. But part of
5. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 610-11, 630 (1986). In Bowen, a plurality of the
Court held that the Department of Health and Human Services failed to justify the need for such
regulations because the agency had not shown that hospitals were withholding medical treatment from
"otherwise qualified" infants. Id. at 630. Because parents must consent to surgery or other treatment
before medical providers could provide it, a lack of parental consent meant that disabled infants were
not "otherwise qualified" to receive treatment and were not denied care "solely by reason of his
handicap." Id. For a criticism of this reasoning, see Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers,
(Mis)framing Schiavo as Discriminationagainst Persons with Disabilities,61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 789,
797 (2007).
6. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106i) (2006).
7. See, e.g., Raymond S. Duff & A.G.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the SpecialCare Nursery, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890, 893 (1973); Anthony Shaw et al., Ethical Issues in Pediatric
Surgery: A NationalSurvey of PediatriciansandPediatricSurgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588 (1977).
8. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 3. See generally Sadath A. Sayeed, The Marginally Viable
Newborn: Legal Challenges, Conceptual Inadequacies, and Reasonableness, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHIcs
600 (2006).
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the challenge is to discern how disability concerns are implicated in
these situations, and this Essay will focus on that question.
As a factual and prognostic matter, important distinctions exist
between the original paradigmatic case of selective non-treatment of
disabled newborns and situations involving very premature
newborns. In a case like Baby Doe's, the parents and physicians
knew at the time of the non-treatment decision that the infant, if he or
she survived, would survive with a lasting disability whose nature, if
not extent, was known. The treatment at issue was known to be
effective in ameliorating a life-threatening condition, but would not
eliminate the disability-producing impairment. In short, if the parents
9
choose to treat, the infant will survive with a known disability.
As several of the presentations at this symposium highlight,
however, prognostic confidence in cases involving extremely
premature newborns is substantially less.' 0 In many cases, it is
uncertain whether the infant will survive even if treatment is
provided. If the infant does survive, it may survive with little or no
long-term deficit in physical or cognitive functioning, or it may
survive with physical or mental impairments that are moderate or
severe. Moreover, physicians and parents cannot forecast with any
degree of certainty how prolonged, invasive, and painful the course
of treatment will be to produce this uncertain outcome. In short, if
treatment is provided, the infant may or may not survive, and if the
infant does survive, it may do so with no disability or with a mild,
moderate, or severe disability that may be either physical or cognitive
in nature. This extreme prognostic uncertainty changes the nature of
parental decision making and changes how disability concerns are
implicated.
In the original Baby Doe scenario, the parents' refusal to consent
to treatment that in all likelihood they would have consented to as a
9. Admittedly, this statement overstates the certainty of any prognosis; the point is simply that
parents in the archetypal Baby Doe scenario were presented with a choice whose implications seemed
clear.
10. See Sayeed, supra note 8, at 600 (referring to marginally viable newborns as presenting
"unparalleled uncertainty about outcomes").
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matter of course if their infant had not been identified as having a
disability appears clearly to have been discrimination based on
disability, whether legally proscribed or not. To the extent the nontreatment decision was influenced by societal and medical biases
toward people with disabilities and misperceptions regarding the
quality of the lived experience enjoyed by people with disabilities
and their families, it seems like the kind of disability discrimination
that our society recognizes as objectionable.
The concerns from the disability perspective look a bit different in
cases of extreme prematurity. For one thing, categorizing infants born
at the margins of viability as being disabled is itself questionable.
These infants, if they survive, are certainly at significant risk of being
disabled, but their future disability is by no means certain. At the time
that decisions must initially be made, everything about their future is
speculative and uncertain."l
As a matter of strict legal definition, an infant delivered at twentythree to twenty-four weeks may well fall within the ADA's definition
of "individual with a disability" by virtue of having an impairment
that significantly limits a major life activity, such as seeing or
breathing. 12 It seems likely, however, that it is not the impairments
existing at the time of delivery that actually give pause to parents and
physicians deciding whether to provide resuscitative and subsequent
treatment to marginally viable newborns. Instead, it is the prospect
that the prematurity could result in one or more disabilities thatperhaps together with other factors-may lead parents to consider
withholding treatment. So, parents seem likely to be influenced more
by the expectation of possible disability than the existence of
disability, as in the original Baby Doe case.
11. Of course, if initial resuscitation and treatment are provided, over time the contours of an
extremely premature infant's anticipated disabilities may become clearer and more definite. This
evolution may change the nature of disability concerns implicated in a single case.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2XA) (2006). This conclusion is particularly likely in light of Congress's
revisions of the statutory definition in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 to include within the
definition of "major life activity" the "operation of a major bodily function," including neurological and
respiratory functions, and to make clear that the definition of disability should be construed broadly. Id.
§ 12102(2)(B), (4XA).
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The other, more subtle point that strikes me is that decisions about
an extremely premature newborn seem less like end-of-life decisions
than beginning-of-life decisions. Without stepping into the morass of
questions about when "life" begins as a constitutional or
philosophical matter, framing the question as involving the beginning
of the infant's experience of life may remove it some from the core of
disability concerns. The central motivating force behind the passage
of the ADA and the disability rights movement has been improving
the lived experience of persons with disabilities. Demanding that
medical interventions be provided to reinforce whatever fragile wisps
of sustainable life a marginally viable newborn presents at birth
arguably has more to do with a vitalist's commitment to preserving
all life than with a disability rights advocate's agenda.
Let me hasten to say that, by pointing out that decisions about
treatment for very premature infants do not present the paradigmatic
disability discrimination scenario, I do not mean to suggest a lack of
concern about how bias might operate in this setting to diminish
opportunities and welfare for people with disabilities. But the
immense complexity of the issues presented by the birth of a
marginally viable newborn requires us to consider the potential for
bias thoughtfully.
II. RESCUING THE MARGINALLY VIABLE NEWBORN

Might a different perspective on the question offer some fresh
insights? Some commentators describe the medical interventions
responding to the birth of a marginally viable newborn as a rescue
operation of sorts. 13 The newborn emerges from the womb in
immediate peril, and all is lost unless the medical team steps in in an
effort to achieve a healthy outcome in spite of long odds. The
question is whether a rescue effort is compulsory.

13. See, e.g., Sayeed, supra note 8, at 607 (referring to "the odds-against opportunity to rescue" that
medical technology offers for marginally viable newborns and to "decisions not to initiate rescue").
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Looking at two different aspects of our societal response to rescues
may be informative. First, when in general terms does a legal duty to
rescue another person in peril arise? Second, what role does the socalled "rescue imperative" play in the scenarios presented by
extremely premature births?
A principle of tort law that first-year law students learn is the "no
duty to rescue" rule, which basically means that an individual has no
duty, enforceable by a claim in tort law, to take actions to assist
another who is in harm's way. 14 To give a graphic example, I have no
legal duty to pull the playing toddler from the railroad tracks, even if
I could do so without any risk of harm to myself.
But like most rules, the "no duty to rescue" rule has its exceptions.
The contours of these exceptions are not precise, but they are often
based on the existence of relationships that impose some kind of
duty. 15 Sometimes a duty is founded on professional relationships,
such as the established relationship between doctor and patient, while
another time the basis may be a familial relationship, like the parentchild relationship. Thus, courts have found that a parent may have a
duty to take reasonable steps to protect her child from harm at the
hands of a third party, 16 and that principle can logically be extended
to require a parent to take steps to rescue her child in a health or
accident-related emergency situation.
That duty's extent, however, is not unbounded, as parents will not
be required to place themselves in grave danger to come to their
children's rescue. The extent of the parents' duty is instead cabined
by the concept of reasonableness, as is so often the case with the law.
Parents must take reasonablesteps to rescue their children from harm
14. Kaho'ohanohano v. Dep't of Human Servs., 178 P.3d 538, 563 (Haw. 2008) ("The general rule is
that a person does not have a duty to act affirmatively to protect another person from harm. The fact that
the actor realizes or should realize that action on his or her part is necessary for another's aid or
protection does not of itself impose upon him or her a duty to take such action.") (citing Lee v.
Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 329 (Haw. 1996)).
15. Id. ("The exceptions to this general rule... arise when a 'special relationship' exists between the
actor and the individual facing harm.") (citing Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 329 (Haw. 1996)).
16. See, e.g., State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 785-86 (N.C. 1982) (holding that the parent-child
relationship confers a duty upon a parent to rescue a child when he or she is in peril); People v. Rolon,
160 Cal. App. 4th 1206, 1215-19 (2008).
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or risk being held civilly and even criminally liable for the resulting
harm.'

7

While American law does not impose a general duty to rescue on
individuals, scholars have recognized that a so-called "rule of rescue"
or "rescue imperative" in fact often motivates a collective rescue
effort to save the lives of identified individuals in peril. This "rule"
highlights our society's willingness to devote extensive resources to
rescue identifiable individuals, even if we are not collectively willing
to devote resources to protect people generally from encountering a
risk in the first place.' 8 A contrast often drawn is between the money
spent and lives risked to rescue trapped miners by a society unwilling
to devote significant resources to enforce mine safety regulations
meant to prevent accidents. The phenomenon occurs in health care
settings as well, where the contrast is drawn between the sense of
obligation to provide expensive, "last chance" therapies that might
save an individual's life, even when funding for preventive care may
be limited. 19
So do these two perspectives on rescue offer any fresh insights for
incorporating disability concerns into how we think about marginally
viable newborns? If we think about the provision of medical
treatment to these infants as a species of rescue, does that affect how
we view the obligation to provide treatment that the Baby Doe rules
seem broadly to mandate?
Discussions often describe the "rule of rescue" as reflecting a
commitment to saving individual life regardless of cost. In other
words, under the rule of rescue, cost poses no limit to the rescue
efforts. 20 By contrast, in the exceptional cases when a legal duty to
rescue is recognized, its extent is limited by the concept of
17. Walden, 293 S.E.2d at 786.
18. See David C. Hadom, Setting Health Care Prioritiesin Oregon: Cost-Effectiveness Meets the
Rule ofRescue, 265 J. AM. MED. AssOc. 2218, 2218-19 (1991). Cf M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of
Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 304-06 (2003) (discussing the tension between the rule of rescue and
the "pursuit of population-wide health maximization").
19. Cf. Leonard M. Fleck, Last Chance Therapies: Can a Just and CaringSociety Do Health Care
Rationing When Life ItselfIs at Stake?, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHiCS 255,275-76 (2002).
20. Id.at 275.
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reasonableness. On first glance, both these points might suggest that
providing treatment to rescue extremely premature newborns would
be uncontroversial and obligatory. After all, the rescue attempt poses
no risk of physical danger to the parents (as intervening during a
physical attack on the child might) and under the "rescue imperative"
the cost of treatment is irrelevant.
What seems to blunt the rescue imperative, however, are concerns
about the very real possibility of future disability if the rescue attempt
produces a survivor. The risk of disabled rescuees does not generally
make it into public discourse about whether to engage in rescue
efforts, even though it seems that a rescuee-whether a miner trapped
in a mine or a child who has fallen down a well-may sometimes
suffer an accident-related disability after a successful rescue effort.
We don't say that we shouldn't try to rescue the trapped miner
because he may end up disabled if we do get him out. By contrast, the
anticipation of future disability features centrally in discussions about
whether medical interventions are mandatory, optional, or futile for
marginally viable newborns.
This suggests that the "rule of rescue"--the moral imperative to try
to save lives regardless of cost-is less robust in cases involving
marginally viable newborns because the specter of a lifetime of
disability blunts that imperative. If that is the case, then perhaps these
cases resemble the original Baby Doe case more closely than I
suggested earlier. Maybe the decisions in these cases really are
primarily about disability, even though the decision makers cannot
forecast with certainty the existence, nature, or extent of future
disability. If so, perhaps the law is justified in prohibiting parental
choices that-in blunt terms-would prefer to accept infant death
over the possibility of a disabled child.
I am skeptical, though, that the dynamics in these cases can be
reduced to such stark terms, and returning to the law's treatment of
the parental duty to rescue proves helpful here. Recall that while the
law imposes a duty on parents to act to protect their children from
harm, parents are legally required only to take reasonable steps to
rescue their offspring. And the modifier of reasonableness requires
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considering the full context of the parents' decisions.
The dangers that attempted rescue poses for the parents are relevant,
and logically so are the dangers that attempted rescue poses for the
infant itself and for other children in the family as well. So, to
illustrate the broader concept, the law might recognize some kind of
duty on the part of a parent who can swim to dive into a lake to try to
rescue her toddler who has fallen from a boat. It is less clear, though,
that the parent would have a duty to dive in if doing so meant leaving
another toddler alone on the boat. More controversially, beyond the
risks of physical danger to self and others, one could argue that
parents' duty to rescue might be limited by risks of significant
emotional or financial harm attendant on the rescue attempt.
If we look at parents' duty to rescue an extremely premature
newborn through this lens, the question of what "reasonable" rescue
attempts the law should require looks more complex. Moreover, the
reasonableness of rescue attempts would be decided on a case-bycase basis in light of all surrounding circumstances. The Baby Doe
Rules, however, explicitly reject a contextualized, case-by-case
approach to parents' treatment choices. 2 1 In that rejection they depart
not only from the tort rules regarding rescue to which I am
analogizing them; they also reject the principles of the very body of
law in which they are embedded. And they do so in a way that may
ultimately detract from the flourishing of people with disabilities.
III. THE BABY DOE RULES AND CHILD WELFARE LAW
Often ignored in discussions of the Baby Doe Rules is the larger
body of law of which they are a part, namely child welfare law.
Specifically, the Rules require states to incorporate in their laws
regarding child abuse and neglect provisions for responding to
instances of medical neglect, defined to include non-treatment of
disabled infants.22 Like the Baby Doe Rules, child welfare laws more
21. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 5106i(b) (2006).
22. Id. § a(b)(2)(B).
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generally set limits on parents' treatment of their children. And if
parents act in ways that fall within a state's definition of child abuse
or neglect, the state can intervene to protect the child.
In defining what parental conduct will be considered abusive or
neglectful, however, states must legislate with an awareness of
constitutional limits on their authority in this realm. Courts have
recognized that the U.S. Constitution protects parents' rights to make
important decisions regarding their children's upbringing, decisions
that deal with schooling, religious training, medical care, and
discipline, among other matters 23. This constitutional right of
"parental autonomy" is part of a broader right of family privacy or
family integrity. 24 It is premised on an understanding that, because
parents generally seek to act in the best interests of their children,
they should enjoy substantial discretion in making decisions for their
only when necessary to protect the
children, with the state interfering
25
child from a significant harm.
This is the framework under which most cases of alleged medical
neglect are handled. Parents generally have the authority to make
decisions for their minor children, but if they fail or refuse to consent
to a treatment needed to prevent their child's death or long-term
disability, the state may intervene, 26 typically by taking custody of
the child for the limited purpose of authorizing treatment. An
example is when a court orders a life-saving blood transfusion for the
child of parents whose religious beliefs proscribe transfusions. 27 in
some senses, these are the "easy" cases: the treatment is a one-time
intervention with known efficacy and few risks, so it is easy for the

23. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
24. See generally David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48
UCLA L. REv. 1125 (2001).
25. Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 604 (1979) (explaining and referring to the "traditional
presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child").
26. See generally Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions
between Parent,State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 311 (1994).
27. See, e.g., Crouse Irving Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
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state to step in, protect the child, and then step back out of the
picture.28
Courts seem less inclined to support the state's intervention into
family privacy when the stakes are lower for the child or when the
proposed treatment's benefits are less clear. For example, one case
involved parents who placed their three-year-old child, who had been
diagnosed with non-Hodgkins lymphoma, in the care of a Christian
Science practitioner rather than consenting to the chemotherapy
recommended by a doctor. Because the chemotherapy was estimated
to have only a 40% chance of success and carried with it the risk of
significant side effects, the court found an insufficient basis for the
state to override the parents' right to determine their child's
treatment, even though doctors predicted that the child would die
without medical treatment.29
Cases like this one highlight the delicate balancing of the parents'
constitutionally protected right to make medical decisions for their
children against the state's interest in protecting a child from serious
harm. It bears emphasis that the state's interventionist authority in
child neglect proceedings is limited to protecting children from
serious harm; the state cannot override parental judgment simply
because it would reach a different conclusion about what is "best" for
the child when more than one reasonable option is available. 30 So
understood, child neglect laws set a floor of minimally acceptable
behavior for parents but do not generally establish a bright line rule
about what parents must provide their children. For better or worse,
child welfare laws often contain standards that are vague and that
leave discretion in the hands of child welfare social workers and
28. 1 use quotation marks for "easy" because these cases are anything but. See generally Arnand H.
M. Antommaria, Jehovah 's Witnesses, Roman Catholicism, and Neo-Calvinism: Religion and State
Intervention in Parental, Medical Decision Making, 8 J. L. & FAM. STuD. 293 (2006) (arguing that
courts and bioethicists de-rationalize and thus marginalize parents' religious beliefs).
29. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991).
30. The Supreme Court made this point in a different context in Troxel, where the Court held
unconstitutional a court's ordering of grandparents' visitation with their grandchildren over the
objections of the children's mother. The Court observed that "the Due Process Clause does not permit a
State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a
state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made." 530 U.S. at 72-73.
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courts as to how the laws apply to the facts of a particular family's
life.3 ' In short, most child welfare laws look pretty different from the
Baby Doe Rules, which characterize a broad group of non-treatment
decisions as medical neglect unless they fall into one of three specific
(though not precise) categories and provide neither parents nor child
32
welfare workers with discretion.
What the Baby Doe Rules do not recognize -despite their
laudable efforts to guard against death-dealing medical decisions
based on bias and stereotypes regarding the value and quality of life
with a disability-is that they are in tension with a competing good:
the value of parental autonomy in making decisions regarding their
children and their families. This tension is magnified in cases
involving marginally viable newborns because of the uncertainty and
complexity their cases entail.
Value may flow from harmonizing our understanding of the Baby
Doe Rules with the broader body of child welfare law, even from a
disability perspective. 33 The law should intervene to protect infants
whose parents make choices that fall below what society deems
minimally acceptable. When there exists a range of acceptable
34
choices, though--or what tort law might call reasonable choices,
31. When insufficiently bounded, this discretion generates criticism that social workers and courts
exercise too much power to make judgments about the existence of abuse or neglect, judgments that
may be infected by bias or false assumptions. See Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In
Search of the Least DrasticAlternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1759 (1987).
32. Federal law recognizes as much, dictating that state child welfare authorities should use
discretion in exercising authority in cases involving medical decisions, "[e]xcept with respect to the
withholding of medically indicated treatments from disabled infants with life threatening conditions." 42
U.S.C. § 5106i(b) (2006).
33. By making this point, I am not arguing that child welfare law is necessarily the optimal legal
framework for addressing the limits on parental decision making regarding marginally viable or disabled
newborns. My more limited point is that, to the extent that Congress has chosen this framework by
enacting the Baby Doe Rules, it may be helpful to understand those Rules as existing within---and
cohering with-the larger framework. For an argument that child neglect law is an inappropriate
framework for addressing issues regarding parents' medical decisions for their minor children, see
Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should Make Health Care
Decisionsfor Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 1 (2000). Although she rejects
the child neglect framework, Professor Rosato agrees that a problem with the Baby Doe Rules is that
they give insufficient deference to parental decisions regarding newborns. See id. at 20-24.
34. Cf Sayeed, supra note 8, at 609 (suggesting the value of "allowing reasonable considerations
other than the mere chance at life to enter our ethical calculus").
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parents should be able to make decisions that accord with their own
values and their understanding of what is best for their infant and
their family.
This suggestion takes inspiration from the contribution by
disability scholar Adrienne Asch to the discussion regarding the
disability critique of prenatal testing for the purposes of permitting
abortion when testing reveals the fetus will have a disability." While
she decries prenatal testing practices as "justified by mistaken
assumptions about the quality of life of people with disabilities, and
are demeaning to existing people with disabilities, 36 Asch does not
argue that pregnant women should be prevented from using prenatal
testing. Instead, she advocates for changes in the rhetoric and
practices surrounding prenatal testing in order to facilitate "true
reproductive choice for women." 37 She asserts that for true
reproductive choice to exist, prospective parents need to hear from
counselors about the full experience-both the satisfactions and
challenges--of raising a child with the disability diagnosable by
38
prenatal testing.
Similarly, parents facing the birth of an extremely premature
newborn could be provided not only with information about the
various possible medical and developmental outcomes for an infant
who receives maximal treatment but also information about the
abilities retained by children having various impairments resulting
from prematurity and whether and how those children can be
participants in family and community life. Of course, because so
much is uncertain at birth and in the earliest days of these infants'
lives, this task may be more challenging than in the case where a
specific disability is diagnosed prenatally. Nonetheless, parents who
35. By drawing this analogy, I do not mean to elide the moral and legal relevance of birth. But both
prenatally and postnatally, the interest in preventing the termination of life on grounds of disability or
potential disability exists in tension with other, competing interests. Prenatally, the competing interest is
the woman's interest in bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy; postnatally, it is the interest of
parents in family privacy and parental autonomy.
36. Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 315, 318 (2003).
37. Id. at 317.
38. Id. at 334-35.
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are provided not only with medical prognoses, but also with
information about the social experience of older children who were
born very prematurely, will be better able to make thoughtful and
informed decisions about what is in the best interests of an infant and
their family. An approach that seeks initially to support parents'
ability to meet their parental obligations is also consistent (at least in
theory) with the general approach of child welfare law. 39 Even under
this approach, some choices will fall below the minimally acceptable
threshold. For example, a refusal to provide life-saving surgery to
correct a minor defect in an infant with Down syndrome might well
be judged to be medical neglect justifying state intervention.40
I recognize that, from a disability perspective, adopting this
approach is a risky proposition. The 2007 Policy Statement from the
American Academy of Pediatrics on Non-initiation or Withdrawal of
Intensive Care for High-Risk Newborns refers to "acceptable" quality
of life and "unacceptable" quality of life for high-risk infants who
survive after receiving intensive treatment without once
acknowledging that these are loaded terms from a disability
perspective. 41 There remains good reason to believe that some parents
facing the bewildering and emotionally volatile situation presented by
an extremely premature birth may be influenced by medical
professionals who are biased or who entertain misconceptions about
living with disability. Efforts to educate parents, neonatologists,
nurses, and social workers regarding the joys and challenges
39. Cf. David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of
ParentalRights Statutes: Punishing the Childfor the Failuresof the State Child Welfare System, 54 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 139, 202-06 (1992) (arguing that, while legislation forcing child welfare agencies to
continue to make "reasonable efforts" to rehabilitate abusive or neglectful parents once the state has
decided to seek termination of parental rights may cause harm to the child involved, agencies should be
required to make reasonable efforts in support of parent-child reunification at earlier stages of child
protection proceedings).
40. 1 should acknowledge that, in arguing for a broader realm of parental autonomy than that
recognized by the Baby Doe Rules, this Essay does not confront the remaining, tough question of what
parental choices involving newborns-whether they are born extremely prematurely or with disabilities
like Down syndrome or spina bifida--should be deemed under this approach not to meet the minimally
acceptable threshold and thus to constitute medical neglect.
41. Committee on Fetus and Newborn, Noninitiationor Withdrawal ofIntensive Carefor High-Risk
Newborns, 119 PEDIATRICS 401 (2007).
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experienced by parents whose children were born very prematurely,
as well as self-reports of those children's quality of life, will need to
be ongoing. And even with education, some parents will decide not to
resuscitate or provide continuing intensive care because of their
concern about what a potential disability, with its attendant psychic,
social, and financial costs, will mean for their family's lives. From a
disability perspective, these decisions may be troubling.
To disable parents from exercising parental autonomy on the
question of how to care for a marginally viable newborn, however,
may carry costs of its own. It diminishes respect for family integrity
and thus may itself be risky from the disability perspective. Family
support and advocacy can play an invaluable role in the flourishing of
persons with disabilities, both individually and collectively, and so
parents should be empowered to play a lead in decision making
throughout the process. To be sure, any assertion about the value of
family support and advocacy for persons with disabilities must be
accompanied by the recognition that children and adults with
disabilities are more likely than their non-disabled counterparts to be
the victims of family violence. Moreover, the constitutional
presumption that parents will act in the best interests of their children
may be particularly weak in the case of newborns, with whom parents
have not enjoyed the same opportunities for the bonding that
typically leads parents to seek their children's best interests. These
points reinforce the importance of establishing some limits on
parents' medical choices for extremely premature newborns 42 but do
not, to my mind, make desirable the Baby Doe Rules' approach of
defining medical neglect broadly to include most instances of nonaggressive treatment for imperiled newborns. For all these reasons, I
would suggest that advocates for the rights and welfare of people
with disabilities should consider the value of supporting the

42. For example, John Robertson suggests that only parents acting on "full information about the
child's conditions and prospects" are entitled to deference and that, therefore, "parents' directions not to
resuscitate at birth should not be given effect until a medical assessment of the child's condition and
prognosis justifying nontreatment has been made." Robertson, supra note 3, at 38.
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educated-and limited-exercise of parental autonomy in cases
involving marginally viable newborns.

